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Approved For Release 2004/03/23 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002200040003-4

Washington, D.C. 20505



30 March 1977


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Soviet Political Item in the President's
Daily Brief, March 26

REFERENCE : Your Memo to Me on Same Subject



2. We receive many such reports and are quite sparing in passing them along. This one gains plausibility because, unlike some others, it lacks an implicit "message" to the U.S. to go easy on Brezhnev; indeed, it suggests that U.S. human rights pressure is politically useful to him. Overall, we judge that it conveys an existing political mood in Moscow, one of substantial but so far ineffective unhappiness about Brezhnev's leadership in domestic affairs.


STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Attachment

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25X1

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SUBJECT: Soviet Political Item in The President's Daily
Brief, March 26

Distribution:

Original - Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

1 - DDCI

2 - A/DDCI/ [redacted]

1 - ER

1 - D/DCI/NI

1 - DDI/CPS/ [redacted]

1 - DDI/ORPA/USSR/ [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505


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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
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SUBJECT : Soviet Political Item in The President's Daily
Brief, March 26

REFERENCE : Your Memo to Me on Same Subject

1. To respond to your questions about the validity of this report, Soviet officials are generally much more circumspect about domestic political gossip than the average Washington cocktail partygoer. But we do regard this story as illustrative rumor rather than fact, and our piece said so at the beginning and the end.



25X1

3. We receive many such reports and are quite sparing in passing them along. This one gains plausibility because, unlike some others, it lacks an implicit "message" to the US to go easy on Brezhnev; indeed, it suggests that US human rights pressure is politically useful to him. Overall, we judge that it conveys an existing political mood in Moscow, one of substantial but so far ineffective unhappiness about Brezhnev's leadership in domestic affairs.

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


Cover Memo TS 770090

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/USSR/EE

John:

DDCI wants a response to this orchestrated very quickly, and mentioned your name as one he'd like to see involved in the process. Could you coordinate a response?



A/DDCI

28/3/77
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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
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Cov Memo TS 770090

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